For the first time since 1956, Israel is openly fighting alongside a Western imperial power in a war whose political repercussions are far from certain.
By Danny R. Johnson – Political News Editor
On October 29, 1956, Israeli paratroopers landed at the Mitla Pass in the Sinai Peninsula. Two hours later, the Israeli army spokesperson issued a statement: “IDF forces entered and engaged Fedayeen units in Ras Al-Naqab and Kuntila, securing positions west of the Nakhel Road junction near the Suez Canal. This operation was conducted in response to Egyptian military attacks targeting Israeli transportation by land and sea, which have resulted in damage and disruption to the lives of Israeli citizens.”
The statement, drafted personally by then Israeli army Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, was almost entirely false from beginning to end. The paratroopers at Mitla were not fighting Palestinian “Fedayeen units,” but regular Egyptian army forces. Nor was the operation a response to “Egyptian attacks” on Israeli transportation.
Instead, it marked the beginning of a war that Israel launched together with Britain and France, the major imperial powers of the time. As Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion put it just before the assault, the aim was to “reorganize the Middle East” and bring about the downfall of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose policies threatened British, French, and Israeli interests.
According to the IDF and Defense Establishment Archives, the invasion of Egypt that began at the Mitla Pass — later known in Israel as the Sinai War, and around the world as the Suez Crisis — “was unique in the history of the State of Israel” because “two European powers … joined it in a joint military move with Israel.”
For many years, this remained a notable historical exception. However, seventy years later, the situation changed. For the first time since 1956, Israel has engaged in conflict alongside ansignificant Western nation—the world’s largest—whose secretary of state recently commended the West’s imperial history at the Munich Security Conference.
The Israeli army has described the joint assault with the U.S. military as a “preemptive strike,” but, as in 1956, this too is a lie. Few seriously believe Iran was on the verge of attacking. The current war is a war of choice, initiated by the United States and Israel, just as the Sinai campaign was decided in advance by Israeli, French, and British leaders.
In 1956, Israel had its own objectives: to stop Palestinian cross-border military operations organized from within the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip and to thwart Egypt’s military buildup, reflected in its 1955 arms deal with the Soviet bloc.
In retrospect, the conflict exhibited clear colonial characteristics. The United Kingdom opposed Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, while France was concerned about his support for Algerian insurgents during the period of French rule. Ben-Gurion and Dayan assessed that Israel could leverage these colonial dynamics to further its strategic objectives, particularly by facilitating the removal of Nasser’s administration.
The current conflict with Iran is justified by intentions to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and halt its backing of proxies in the Middle East, as well as claims of freeing Iranians from authoritarian rule. However, regardless of how serious these reasons are, it’s clear that both the United States and Israel have wider ambitions—specifically, overthrowing Iran’s government and establishing a new balance of power in the region.
It is noteworthy that in the 70 years since the Sinai War, Israel has avoided openly enlisting in American wars, always presenting its campaigns as sovereign acts undertaken in its own name. Indeed, Israel has bristled at accusations of serving as a U.S. proxy. Even when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared last summer that Israel was “fighting on behalf of Western civilization,” he still pretended that it was doing so out of its own free will.
Israel’s independence was never entirely genuine, as its military actions and long-standing occupation have consistently relied on American funding, armaments, support, and diplomacy. Nevertheless, both nations often sustained the illusion of autonomy. During the Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003, the United States took deliberate steps to keep Israel separate from active combat. Even the “12-Day War” with Iran last June was presented as an “Israeli” conflict, though Trump only became involved toward its conclusion.
Washington and Tel Aviv now openly pursue shared goals that extend beyond regional order. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described Israel as a strong partner, noting its willingness to use force without hesitation—contrasting it with more cautious allies. Israel Katz echoed this ethos in current Israeli policy.
If, in 1956, Israel could conquer the Sinai Peninsula alone, this time, too, it did not truly need a Western power to strike Iran and severely damage its nuclear and missile programs. It proved that last June. Therefore, the decision to act jointly appears tied precisely to the “larger” objectives: regime change and a reordered Middle East.
It is not certain that those goals can be achieved (at least through the chosen means of aerial bombardment), but what is clear is that Israel lacks sufficient military power and political capital to attempt such a project alone. That can only be done shoulder-to-shoulder with a global power like the United States — and only through an openly imperial war.
Israel’s Rolling the Dice with Iran
In 1956, Israel won quickly. Within five days, it had conquered the Sinai Peninsula with relatively few casualties. But the political outcome was a different story.
An extraordinary American/Soviet coalition forced Israel, Britain, and France to withdraw, leaving them humiliated. Israel had to shelve Ben-Gurion’s grand vision of a “Third Kingdom of Israel,” proclaimed with characteristic pathos at the war’s end. And above all, Nasser emerged victorious. In the decade leading up to the 1967 War, he became the undisputed leader of the Arab world and one of the most prominent figures of what was then called the Third World.
A few days into the current war, the Islamic Republic has suffered severe blows, first and foremost the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Even if the regime proves capable of sustaining a protracted conflict, the military superiority of Israel and America is absolute: almost any country would struggle to match the combined force of the world’s most powerful military alongside the strongest army in the Middle East.
The primary issue extends beyond military developments in the conflict to encompass its political resolution, which is complex. Should the Iranian regime either collapse or experience “Venezuelization”—maintaining formal structure while acquiescing to American influence—Israel is likely to secure a significant role in the discussions shaping a new Middle Eastern framework.
An unchecked use of force might allow Israel to intensify actions against Iran, accelerate West Bank annexation, and further suppress Gaza. Netanyahu’s timing may be aimed at preventing a move toward the next phase of the ceasefire in Gaza. Given his close involvement in the Iran conflict, it would be difficult for Trump to pressure Netanyahu to withdraw from Gaza without fully disarming Hamas.
If the Iranian regime endures, Israel’s joint war with the United States could backfire.
Public support in the United States for the bombing campaign is limited, with critics labeling it “an Israeli war.” Right-wing commentator Tucker Carlson argued that the conflict began because Israel wanted it to, stating, “it did not break out in the name of American national security interests.” Democratic Senator Chris Murphy warned, “The idea that Netanyahu can decide where America goes to war, risking the lives of hundreds and perhaps thousands of American soldiers, is chilling.”
Secretary of State Marco Rubio originally indicated that the United States became involved only because Israel initiated the conflict, but he later reversed his stance to be consistent with Trump. Trump quickly sought to reject this idea, saying, “If anything, I might have forced Israel’s hand.” If the war does not accomplish its objectives and leads to numerous American casualties, Israel may end up being blamed within the United States.
Israeli officials have responded positively to strong statements against Iran from Gulf nations that were targeted, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain. They view these comments as evidence of shared interests in opposing Iran. However, this interpretation may not reflect the full reality.
Recently, a Saudi commentator on Al-Araby criticized Iran for attacking locations in neighboring Gulf countries instead of focusing more attacks on Israel, mentioning a strike in Beit Shemesh as an example of an effective attack by Iran. This suggests that the “Saudi partner” that Israel hopes for desires to see more Israeli casualties. Separately, another Saudi commentator told Al Jazeera that despite their frustration with Iran, Saudi Arabia “cannot join an Israeli attack.”
Israel’s Lonely Push for War with Iran
Iran currently seems to believe that attacking Gulf states and closing the Strait of Hormuz—although these actions cause negative reactions throughout the Arab world—will compel those states to push the United States to stop the war. This approach has some rationale; reports indicate that Qatar and the UAE are urging President Trump to end the conflict swiftly. While the Gulf states may be upset with Iran, they could also hold Israel responsible for initiating the war.
Should the war end from external pressure, Iran may find it difficult to claim victory after suffering significant losses. Meanwhile, Israel’s reputation as a dominant regional power could diminish, having used its military strength and U.S. support without reaching its political objectives.
Less than a week has passed since the conflict began, making it too early to discuss what will happen next. At present, it can be observed that Israel has abandoned a long-standing policy by aligning closely with the region’s most powerful empire and actively participating in joint warfare. While this may appear to be a calculated strategic move, Israel’s decision to erase any separation between itself and the United States—widely viewed in much of the Arab world as a major source of instability in the area—could ultimately work against its own interests.
