By SDCN Staff
WASHINGTON–The Justice Department announced that a former U.S. Navy sailor who was convicted of espionage by a federal jury in August 2025, was sentenced in federal court to 200 months in prison.
Jinchao Wei, 25, also known as Patrick Wei, was arrested in August 2023 on espionage charges as he arrived for work on the amphibious assault ship U.S.S. Essex at Naval Base San Diego, the homeport of the Pacific Fleet. He was indicted by a federal grand jury, accused of selling national defense information to an intelligence officer working for the People’s Republic of China for $12,000.
“Members of the United States military swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States,” said Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche. “This active-duty U.S. Navy sailor betrayed his country and compromised the national security of the United States. The Justice Department will not tolerate this behavior. We stand ready to investigate, defend, and protect the interests of the American people.”
Following a five-day trial and one day of deliberation, the jury convicted Wei of six crimes, including conspiracy to commit espionage, espionage, and unlawful export of, and conspiracy to export, technical data related to defense articles in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. He was found not guilty of one count of naturalization fraud.
According to evidence presented at trial, Wei, in his role as a machinist’s mate, held a U.S. security clearance and had access to sensitive national defense information about the ship’s weapons, propulsion and desalination systems. Amphibious assault ships like the Essex resemble small aircraft carriers and allow the U.S. military to project power and maintain presence by serving as the cornerstone of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious readiness and expeditionary strike capabilities.
On February 14, 2022, Wei was recruited by a Chinese intelligence officer via social media who at first portrayed himself as a naval enthusiast who worked for the state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. The evidence showed that even during the early days of his espionage career, Wei strongly suspected the intelligence officer’s true identity and motive.
On February 22, 2022, Wei told a friend who was also in the U.S. Navy that he thought he was “on the radar of a China intelligence organization,” as he was in contact with an individual who was “extremely suspicious,” “interested in the maintenance cycle of naval ships,” and wanted him to “walk the pier” to “see which ships are docked” on a “daily basis.” Wei said that this person would pay him $500. Wei told his friend that he is “no idiot” and that “this is quite obviously f— espionage.”
Wei’s friend suggested that Wei delete the contact. Instead of heeding his friend’s advice, the very next day Wei transitioned his communications with the intelligence officer to a different encrypted messaging application that he believed was more secure and began spying for the intelligence officer.
The evidence showed that between March 2022 and when he was arrested in August 2023, Wei, at the request of the intelligence officer, sent photographs and videos of the Essex, advised the officer of the location of various Navy ships, and described the defensive weapons of the Essex. He also described problems with his ship and other ships based at Naval Base San Diego and elsewhere. And, he sent the intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical and operational information about U.S. Navy surface warfare ships like the Essex that he took from restricted U.S. Navy computer systems.
In exchange for this information, the officer paid Wei more than $12,000 over 18 months. In one of his larger thefts of U.S. Navy data, Wei sold the intelligence officer at least 30 technical and operating manuals about U.S. Navy systems. These manuals contained export control warnings and detailed the operations of multiple systems aboard the Essex and similar ships, including power, steering, weapons control, aircraft and deck elevators, as well as damage and casualty controls. In total, Wei sold the intelligence officer approximately 60 technical and operating manuals about U.S. Navy ships, as well as dozens of photographs and papers about the U.S. Navy and Wei’s assignments on the Essex. Many of the manuals contained conspicuous export-control warnings on their cover pages.
During the trial, the government presented evidence including phone conversations, electronic messages, and audio messages that Wei exchanged with his Chinese handler. These messages showed how they communicated, what they spoke about, the need for secrecy, the efforts they made to cover their tracks, the tasks issued by his case handler, and how Wei was paid for his work via an online payment method.
As their relationship developed, Wei called his handler “Big Brother Andy” and obliged requests to keep their relationship secret by using multiple encrypted apps; deleting messages and accounts; using digital “dead drops” that disappear in 72 hours; and using a new computer and phone provided by his handler.
The government told the jury that the evidence showed Wei was aware that what he was doing was wrong. He had received recent training from the Navy regarding how to detect recruitment efforts from foreign governments; he attempted to conceal his activity; and he searched the internet about another case in which a U.S. Navy sailor was convicted of espionage, even reading a Department of Justice press release about that case.
Much of the evidence showed the evolution of Wei’s relationship with his handler – Wei’s increasing willingness to collect more and more sensitive information, and the intelligence officer’s employment of intelligence tradecraft to keep developing Wei as a spy and to conceal their relationship and activities from U.S. authorities. For example, the jury saw photographs of the hand-written receipts that Wei created and sent to his handler to be paid and conversations that Wei and his handler had regarding the handler’s increasingly generous offers to Wei, such as a trip for Wei and his mother to travel to China. Moreover, the jury was presented with documents and records obtained from electronic accounts demonstrating the intelligence officer’s identity as a PRC intelligence officer, including photographs and identification documents.
During his post-arrest interview Wei admitted that he gave the intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical and operating manuals and export-controlled data about U.S. Navy surface warfare ships, and that the intelligence officer paid him thousands of dollars for these materials. He also admitted that he knew that his actions were wrong and that he had tried to hide his activities. When the interviewing agents asked Wei how he would describe what he had been doing with the intelligence officer, Wei responded, “espionage.”
Wei, during his post-arrest interview with FBI: “I’m screwed.”
FBI: “What makes you say that?”
Wei: “That I’m sharing the unclassified document to—I mean document with, uhm, him . . . I’m not supposed to do that.”
The crime of espionage under the U.S. Code Section 794 has never been charged in this district. The statute is reserved for the most serious circumstances involving the passage of national defense information intended to harm the United States or for the benefit of a foreign power.
“Wei swore loyalty to the United States when he joined the Navy and reaffirmed that oath when he became a citizen,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Eisenberg. “He then accepted the solemn responsibility of protecting this Nation’s secrets when the United States entrusted him with sensitive Navy information.”
This case was investigated by the FBI and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney John Parmley from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California and Adam Barry, former Trial Attorney from the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section who is currently Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Columbia.
The U.S. Department of State, the Transportation Security Administration, and Homeland Security Investigations provided valuable assistance.
